LFU:online

This course gives an introduction to the theory of mechanism and market design and some of its key-applications. The main theoretical building blocks are the theory of social choice, incentives, implementation, and matching that will be addressed throughout the first week of the course. The theoretical insights will be applied to the design of (entry-level) labor markets, exchange platforms for student housing or organ-transplants, and the allocation of infrastructure throughout the second week of the course. Students will be enabled to analyze the performance of existing markets and exchange institutions and to formulate design recommendations.

The course consists of an introduction to the theory of market design and an analysis of real-life markets and exchange platform. Theoretical topics covered are the possibility and impossibility theorems of social choice and a game theoretic analysis of matching and housing markets. Empirically, we will address field studies on applied market design and laboratory experiments on behavior in matching and exchange institutions.  

lecture, discussion, student presentation, home work assignments

Take-home assignments, in-class participation, presentation, final paper.

Core Texts

Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (RS), Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Sonmez, T. and U. Unver (SU), Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources, Handbook of Social Economics.

The literature (plus schedule, slides etc.) will be downloadable in the ecampus.

Schedule:  23.-27.11 und 7.-11-12.2015 in Besprechungsraum Finanzwissenschaft (4th floor). Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursdays 14-17 und Tuesdays and Fridays 10-13.